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Abstract
This paper extends the existing research on real estate investment trust (REIT)
operating efficiencies. We estimate a stochastic-frontier panel-data model speci-
fying a translog cost function, covering 1995 to 2003. The results disagree with
previous research in that we find little evidence of scale economies and some
evidence of scale diseconomies. Moreover, we also generally find smaller ineffi-
ciencies than those shown by other REIT studies. Contrary to previous research,
the results also show that self-management of a REIT associates with more inef-
ficiency when we measure output with assets. When we use revenue to measure
output, selfmanagement associates with less inefficiency. Also contrary with pre-
vious research, higher leverage associates with more efficiency. The results further
suggest that inefficiency increases over time in three of our four specifications.
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I. Introduction 
Over the past decade, the publicly traded Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) industry 
experienced extensive growth and change. The industry expanded from a total market 
capitalization of $8.74 billion (119 REITs) in 1990 to $305.1 billion (190 REITs) in 2004 
(NAREIT.org). Based on these statistics, the size of the average publicly traded REIT has 
increased from $73.4 million in 1990 to $1.6 billion in 2004. Given the dramatic changes to both 
the industry and the size of the average REIT, considerable interest emerged on the 
underpinnings and the sustainability of the growth of this sector. 
 Two schools of thought exist regarding the long-term viability of projected growth and 
consolidation in the REIT industry. One opinion argues that the full potential for this sector 
remains untapped. Essentially, REITs can develop as low-cost producers of investment real 
estate through growth. The sources of the competitive advantage include economies of scale, 
lower capital costs, and superior sources of capital (Linneman, 1997). At the same time, a second 
opinion argues that the real estate industry still exhibits a cyclical pattern and that the industry 
cannot sustain the current growth spurt. Vogel (1997) suggests that external factors drive the 
rapid growth of the REIT industry and do not arise from superior operating performance. 
Generally, most analysts believe that scale economies and the potential for gains in operating 
efficiencies do exist. Considerable debate continues, however, over the sources and the 
magnitude of these efficiencies (see Anderson, Lewis, Springer, 2000, for a general review). 
 This paper extends the research on REIT operating efficiencies and scale economies. 
First, while previous studies, for the most part, considered a single output measure with which to 
measure efficiency and scale economies, we use two alternative output measures. Next, whereas 
previous studies generally used cross-sectional analysis, we employ a panel-data model, covering 
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1995 to 2003. Specifying a translog cost function, we estimate a stochastic-frontier panel-data 
model of REIT operating efficiencies that also identifies various influences on efficiency. 
 The results disagree with previous research in that we find little evidence of scale 
economies and some evidence of scale diseconomies. Moreover, the consideration of input prices 
and the analysis of the industry using a multi-year sample generally reveal smaller inefficiencies 
than those shown by other studies. Contrary to previous studies, the results also show that self-
management of a REIT associates with more inefficiency when we measure output with assets. 
When we use revenue to measure output, self-management associates with less inefficiency. 
Also contrary with prior research, higher leverage associates with more efficiency. The results 
further suggest that inefficiency increases over time in three of our four specifications. 
 The paper unfolds as follows. The next section reviews the existing literature for both 
efficiency studies, in general, and of REITs, in particular. Section III discusses the stochastic-
frontier, panel-data methodology used to estimate REIT operating efficiency. Section IV reports 
and interprets the results of our analysis. Section V concludes. 
II. Literature review 
Cost scale and efficiency studies, using frontier techniques, of the financial services industry 
remain controversial. The controversy stems from, at least, two sources -- the general debate in the 
empirical production analysis literature and the peculiarities of the financial firm. 
Approaches to Frontier Estimation 
Farrell (1957) introduces the basic framework for studying and measuring inefficiency, defined as 
deviations of actual from "optimum behavior." The frontier establishes the optimum benchmark 
against which to calculate deviations. Various methods, using statistical and mathematical 
programming techniques, exist for the construction-estimation of the relevant frontier. At one 
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level, a general distinction emerges between deterministic and stochastic frontiers.1 Both 
techniques bound the data, but in different ways. Deterministic frontiers by construction fix the 
frontier in the relevant space and encompass all sample observations. Thus, a small subset of data 
supports the frontier, making it more prone to sampling, outlier, and statistical noise problems, 
which may distort the measurement of efficiency.2 Two different techniques exist for constructing 
deterministic frontiers. Mathematical programming techniques assume no statistical noise, an 
assumption that seems unreasonable for large economic data sets (Schmidt 1985-86), while the 
statistical approach to deterministic frontier estimation asserts that random shocks, statistical noise, 
and firm-specific effects together reflect inefficiency, a rather questionable practice (Førsund, 
Lovell, and Schmidt 1980).  
 Stochastic frontiers avoid some of the problems associated with deterministic frontiers by 
explicitly considering the stochastic properties of the data, and distinguishing through a composite 
error term between firm-specific effects, and random shocks or statistical noise. Here, the frontier 
can shift from one observation to the next, being random rather than exact. 
 Other problems still exist, however, with the parametric stochastic-frontier approach. First, 
implementation requires the choice of an explicit functional form for the production or cost 
function, the appropriateness of which raises questions. The use of a flexible functional form, such 
as the translog, helps to alleviate this concern to some extent.  
                                                 
1 Deterministic frontiers fall into two categories -- either non-parametric (e.g., Farrell 1957) or parametric, and in the 
latter case, either non-statistical (e.g., Aigner and Chu 1968, and Timmer 1971) or statistical (e.g., Afriat 1972, and 
Richmond 1974). Stochastic frontiers can exhibit either parametric (e.g., Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt 1977, and 
Meeusen and van den Broek 1977) or non-parametric (e.g., Banker and Maindiratta 1992) specifications. Schmidt 
(1985-86), Forsund, Lovell, and Schmidt (1980), and Bauer (1990) review this literature with a discussion of the 
technical and conceptual problems associated with the estimation of frontiers and the difficulties of measuring 
efficiency relative to the frontier benchmark. Schmidt's (1980) discussion includes an extensive bibliography. 
2 Van den Broek, Førsund, Hjalmarsson, and Meeusen (1980) provide much discussion and empirical evidence. 
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 Second, the researcher imposes strong distributional assumptions on the error term. While 
debate continues, some evidence suggests a limited effect of distributional assumptions on the 
obtained estimates (e.g., Cowing, Reifschneider, and Stevenson 1983, and Greene 1990). 
Moreover, the relative rankings of firms based on inefficiency calculations seem unaffected. But, 
the absolute levels of inefficiencies differ over different distributional assumptions on the one-
sided error term, with "... the single parameter models ... providing a more pessimistic impression 
than warranted." (Greene 1990, p. 158). 
 To avoid problems associated with the aforementioned "edge" frontier models, Berger and 
Humphrey (1991) introduce the "thick" frontier model, where a larger number of "best-practice" 
firms support the frontier and where the estimation of inefficiency requires weaker distributional 
assumptions. In the case of multiple-input, multiple-output technology, this approach proves 
problematic, however, as the ordering criterion implies a different model from that estimated.3
Frontier Studies of Real Estate Investment Trust Scale and Efficiency 
Examination of economies and diseconomies of scale of REITs predates REIT efficiency studies. 
Bers and Springer (1997, 1998a,b) and Ambrose and Pennington-Cross (2000) employ the 
standard approach of estimating the cost function without allowing for the possibility of inefficient 
production (i.e., production above the efficient cost function). They all find evidence of economies 
of scale for REITs.  
 We know of four frontier studies of REIT operating efficiency. Two papers employ data 
envelopment analysis (DEA). Anderson, Springer, Fok, and Webb (2002) calculate economies of 
                                                 
3 Berger and Humphrey (1991) order the firms according to the average total cost per dollar of assets. The banks in the 
lowest average cost quartile form the base for estimating the multiple-input, multiple-output cost function, which they 
then compare to that of the highest average cost quartile. A possible inconsistency arises, however, as the ordering of 
banks implied by the aggregate, one-dimensional measure (i.e., average total cost per dollar of assets) need not capture 
the same ordering based on an index consistent with the multiple-input, multiple-output nature of the cost function 
eventually estimated. Moreover, this ordering may reflect more biased than it appears at first glance, since costs will 
incorporate different, rather than identical, input prices. 
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scale and inefficiency for REITs, employing DEA for a sample ranging from 1992 to 1996. They 
find extremely large inefficiencies, ranging from about 45 to 60 percent. Anderson and Springer 
(2003) calculate REIT efficiency, using DEA for a sample ranging from 1995 to 1999, and then 
use that measure as an indicator for portfolio selection. Although not the main focus of their paper, 
they also report extremely large levels of inefficiency.  
 Unlike the first two studies that employ DEA analysis, Lewis, Springer, and Anderson 
(2003) employ a stochastic frontier that incorporates Bayesian statistics to calculate economies of 
scale and inefficiency for REITs with a sample from 1995 to 1997. They report much lower levels 
of inefficiency than either of the DEA studies. Using the Bayesian stochastic frontier methodology, 
they also determine on a case-by-case basis whether inefficiency differs between REITs because of 
(1) management type (i.e., self or externally managed), (2) leverage (i.e., high or low leverage), 
and (3) portfolio diversification (i.e., specialized and diversified).4 They find that self-management 
correlates with higher efficiency in 1995 and 1996, but with lower efficiency in 1997. That 1997 
finding raises some concern, since it proves inconsistent with prior work (Bers and Springer 1998b 
and Anderson, Springer, Fok, and Webb 2002). Higher debt-ratio REITs exhibit higher 
inefficiency than lower debt-ratio REITs in all three years. Finally, REIT diversification does not 
affect efficiency, contrary to some of the existing evidence (Bers and Springer 1998b and 
Anderson, Springer, Fok, and Webb 2002).  
 The last, and most recent, frontier study by Ambrose, Highfield, and Linneman (2005) also 
use a stochastic-frontier approach. Using data from 1990 to 2001, they find scale economies. They 
consider the stochastic-frontier specification in their penultimate section. The description of the 
model and its estimation proves sketchy, at best. 
                                                 
4 A dummy variable captures whether the REIT experiences external of self-management. High debt REITs hold a 
debt ratio above 67 percent. Finally, a Hirschman-Herfindhal index above 8,000 of portfolio diversification 
identifies a non-diversified portfolio. 
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 General agreement exists on how to measure output – total assets or dividing total assets 
into sub-categories. For the DEA studies, inputs reflect total cost or its sub-components – interest 
expense, operating expense, general and administrative expense, and management fees. For the 
stochastic frontier models, typically researchers include input prices. Lewis, Springer, and 
Anderson (2003) do not introduce any input prices, but only include output in the translog cost 
function.5 Ambrose, Highfield, and Linneman (2005) appear to use input costs rather than input 
prices in their stochastic-frontier model.6
III. Methodology 
Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and Van den Broeck (1977) first introduce the 
stochastic-frontier model, where a stochastic frontier provides an upper bound on actual 
production. The basic model includes a composite error term that sums a two-sided error term, 
measuring all effects outside the firm’s control, and a one-sided, non-negative error term, 
measuring technical inefficiency. A firm can lie on or within the frontier, and the distance 
between actual output and the frontier output represents technical inefficiency. The early articles 
on stochastic frontiers used cross-section data. With panel data, however, later models 
(Cornwell, Schmidt, and Sickles, 1990; Kumbhakar, 1990; Battese and Coelli, 1992) include 
time-varying inefficiency. 
The Framework 
In the present study, we view the REIT firm as an intermediary, operating in competitive markets 
and using a multiple input-output technology. The concept of efficiency (and, thus, inefficiency), 
although well rooted in the history of economic thought, possesses a normative character, which is 
                                                 
5 That translog cost function appears in Bers and Springer (1998a,b). 
6 As just noted, Ambrose, Highfield, and Linneman (2005) provide a sketchy description of the model and its 
estimation. 
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reinforced by the short list of inputs normally considered in empirical models.7 Our interpretation 
accords with the widely held view of production as a systematic technical relationship of inputs 
and outputs, and with the observation that firms can survive in markets for extended periods, even 
though they appear to operate at relatively lower levels of efficiency. 
 Our analysis proceeds as follows. We specify and estimate a composite-error model. This 
model separates firm-specific effects, captured by the one-sided error term (uit), from random 
shocks and statistical noise, reflected by the two-sided, symmetric error term (vit), and permits the 
estimation of firm-specific deviations, using the method of Jondrow, Lovell, Materov, and Schmidt 
(1982). We also evaluate the role of some other firm-specific factors that may affect the level of 
inefficiency by specifying the one-sided error term as depending on these additional control 
variables (Battese and Coelli 1995; Coelli 1996).  
The Model 
We estimate a translog variable cost function with a composite error term (εit) that can be written as 
follows (we drop firm and time subscripts to simplify): 
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where lnC = the natural logarithm of the cost; lnqi = the natural logarithm of the ith output 
(i=1,...,m); ln(1+pj) = the natural logarithm of one plus the jth input price (j=1,...,n); ε = v + u with 
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q
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0 θθ s = alternative control 
variables; w = a two-sided, symmetric random error ≈ N(0, σ2w); and α, ß, π, δ, φ, and θ equal 
                                                 
7 Stigler (1976) discusses these issues with some insightful observations. 
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coefficients. Since a few observations for pj equal zero, we took the natural logarithm of (1 + pj) so 
as to not lose those observations. 
 The technical efficiency index for each firm in the sample is given as follows (Battese and 
Coelli 1995; and Coelli 1996): 
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 We adopt the translog cost function for two basic reasons. First, it imposes virtually no 
restrictions on the first- and second-order effects. At the same time, it also provides a second-order 
logarithmic approximation to an arbitrary continuous transformation surface.8 Second, the dual 
approach, although not free of problems itself, allows the bypassing of the well-known problems of 
multicollinearity that inherently plagues the direct approach. The reliability of our results hinges, of 
course, on the validity of the cost-minimization assumption. 
The Data 
Our data include 1995 to 2003 information on publicly traded REITs listed in the National 
Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts (NAREIT) Handbook and the SNL REIT Quarterly. 
Due to missing values, the final sample consists of 212, 221, 222, 236, 233, 220, 208, 198, and 132 
REITs in 1995, 1996, …, and 2003, respectively, for a total of 1851 observations.9 Table 1 reports 
summary statistics.  
 We employ two alternative aggregate measures of output (q) as follows: total assets and 
total revenue. That is, the translog cost function includes only one output, but we estimate two 
 
8 Previous research on the cost structure of commercial banks concludes in favor of our specification. For example, 
Lawrence (1989) rejects both the more-restrictive Cobb-Douglas specification and the more-flexible Box-Cox 
transformation in favor of the translog. Also, Noulas, Ray, and Miller (1990a), using Call Report data for large banks, 
conclude against homotheticity, constant returns to scale, etc., while Noulas, Miller, and Ray (1993) demonstrate the 
instability of the findings from alternative Box-Cox transformations. 
9 In addition to missing values, we deleted all observations that exhibited a debt-to-asset ratio exceeding one. 
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specifications with different output definitions for each modification of the general model. Lewis, 
Springer, and Anderson (2003) employ total assets and market capitalization (i.e., share price times 
the number of shares) as alternative measures of output. Other studies typically employ assets to 
measure output. Lewis, Springer, and Anderson (2003) conclude that assets perform the best. Thus, 
we use the standard measure of output as well as a new measure.  
 Prior researchers (Bers and Springer 1998a,b; Lewis, Springer, and Anderson 2003) faced 
a major problem of no input prices.10 While the data source puts a severe constraint on 
generating input prices, we construct two proxies for input prices. The inputs include interest 
expense and the sum of operating expense, general and administrative expense, and management 
fees. We calculate the input prices as follows: the average interest cost per dollar of debt 
(average price of debt, i) and the average other expenses per dollar of assets (average price of 
other inputs, r). The dependent variable equals total cost (C), which includes (1) interest expense, 
(2) operating expense, (3) general and administrative expense, and (4) management fees. 
 We also introduce several control variables. First, we employ the debt-to-asset ratio as a 
shift variable in the cost frontier. That is, for each REIT, the cost function’s intercept shifts due to 
differences in leverage. A higher leveraged REIT should face higher costs, on average, since the 
debt-service cost will rise. Moreover, REITs do not garner any tax shield effect, since the interest 
expense does not receive a tax deduction. Second, we add three variables to explain changes in 
efficiency. One, a time variable (i.e., time = 1, 2, …, and 9) determines whether REITs became 
more or less cost efficient over the sample period. Two, we include a dummy variable (i.e., 
Self_Managed) that equals one, if the REIT is self-managed; zero otherwise. This dummy variable 
determines whether self-managed firms prove more cost efficient than externally managed REITs. 
                                                 
10 Ambrose, Highfield, and Linneman (2005) appear to use input costs and not input prices in their stochastic-
frontier model estimation. 
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Three, we also employ the debt-to-asset ratio as a continuous variable. This variable decides 
whether higher-debt REITs exhibit worse efficiency than lower-debt REITs.11
IV. Results 
Tables 2 and 3 present the findings for output defined as total assets and total revenue, 
respectively. We consider the cost frontier without input prices to compare with Lewis, Springer, 
and Anderson (2003). Thus, for the simple models without input prices, all coefficients prove 
significant at the 1- or 5-percent levels. The debt-to-asset ratio shows that REITs face significantly 
higher (frontier) costs, other things constant, with higher leverage. 
 The estimates allow the calculation of economies or diseconomies of scale. For example, 
the calculation of the cost elasticity with respect to output in the more complex specification using 
assets as output comes from the coefficients in Table 2. The exact calculation equals the following: 
 )1ln()0129.0()1ln()1027.0(ln)0005.0(20166.1
ln
ln riAssets
Assets
Cost +++−+=∂
∂ , (3) 
where we need to include values for lnAssets, ln(1+i), and ln(1+r). The bottom of Tables 2 and 3 
report the cost elasticity with respect to output for the average, median, maximum, and minimum 
values of output. In addition, we use the average values for the other right-hand side except in the 
calculation of the median cost elasticity where we use the medians for all the variables. For 
example, the cost elasticity for the maximum value of lnAssets in the complex specification equals 
1.0283. That is, costs rise slightly more than proportionately with assets, implying diseconomies of 
scale. That calculation used the maximum value for lnAssets (i.e., 17.0662) as well as the average 
values for ln(1+i) (i.e., 0.0653) and ln(1+r) (i.e., 0.1051) on the right-hand side of the cost 
elasticity shown above. 
                                                 
11 Remember that we also allow total cost to adjust due to differences in leverage. 
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 Except for the complex model for assets, the other three models imply little, if any, 
economies or diseconomies of scale, since the cost elasticity nearly equals one. The complex 
specification for assets suggests that diseconomies of scale exist at both the average and the 
median. Lewis, Springer, and Anderson (2003) report economies (increasing returns) to scale for 
1995, 1996, and 1997, using assets as the measure of output. Bers and Springer (1997, 1998a,b) 
and Anderson, Springer, Fok, and Webb (2002) also report economies of scale for samples of 
REITs in the 1990s. The limited evidence for diseconomies of scale diminishes when we employ 
revenue as output or when we exclude the input price control variables.12
 Our inefficiency estimates generally prove even smaller than those of Lewis, Springer, and 
Anderson (2003), who report dramatic reductions in inefficiency estimates when using the 
Bayesian stochastic frontier specification rather than DEA. For our model that comes closest to the 
Lewis, Springer, and Anderson (2003) specification, we report higher inefficiency (90 percent), on 
average, than they do (i.e., 10 to 30 percent). Our other measures of inefficiency fall to 13, 22, and 
14 percent, on average. 
 Finally, we consider the effect of our control variables on the level of inefficiency across 
REITs and time. Consider again the simple model with output defined as assets. The constant term 
in the estimation of the average (mean) of the one-sided inefficiency term equals –1.6301. What 
does this imply? Since we estimate the mean of the truncated normal distribution function that 
captures the inefficiency, a negative mean implies that the normal distribution locates to the left of 
the origin. The distribution truncates the negative values, leaving only the right-side tail of the 
distribution. Now, consider the coefficient of self-management of 0.5978. Thus, for self-managed 
REITs, the self-management dummy variable equals 1 and the new mean of the truncated normal 
                                                 
12 Bers and Springer (1997) do find that the number of REITs exhibiting economies of scale diminishes with the 
inclusion of other control variables 
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distribution equals –1.0323 (= –1.6301 + 0.5978). Thus, the distribution shifts to the right and the 
size of the truncated tail used to calculate the inefficiency becomes larger, implying that 
inefficiency rises. In sum, self-management generates more inefficient REITs in the specification 
closest to the Lewis, Springer, and Anderson (2003) model. They find that self-management 
reduces inefficiency in 1995 and 1996, but increases inefficiency in 1997. Our results consider the 
period from 1995 to 2003 and shows that for this specification self-management increases 
inefficiency, on average.  
 The debt-to-asset ratio provides consistent results across all specifications. To wit, a higher 
debt ratio associates with more efficient REIT operations. This finding counters the results of 
Lewis, Springer, and Anderson (2003) from their Bayesian stochastic frontier specification. Note, 
however, a key difference between our findings and those of Lewis, Springer, and Anderson. They 
consider the effects of self-management, the debt ratio, and portfolio diversification on a case-by-
case basis. We include all control variables simultaneously.13 Further, our specification of the 
frontier cost function includes the debt-to-asset ratio as a shift variable. More specifically, we find 
a significant effect whereby higher-leveraged REITs operate on a higher frontier cost function. 
But, given this finding, higher-leveraged REITs must exercise much more care in their operations, 
achieving higher efficiency than their lower-leveraged colleagues. Lewis, Springer, and Anderson 
(2003) do not use the debt-to-asset ratio to shift their cost frontier. Thus, the effect of the debt-to-
asset ratio on the cost function dominates its effect on improving efficiency, probably leading to 
their conclusion that a high debt-to-asset ratio REIT exhibits more inefficiency (less efficiency). 
 Some evidence exists suggesting that REITs become more inefficient over time. Three 
coefficients prove significantly positive, and only one significantly negative in the complex 
                                                 
13 We do not consider the portfolio diversification variable. But, Lewis, Springer, and Anderson (2003) find that this 
variable does not generate a consistent effect on REIT inefficiency. 
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specification with output measured by assets. We anticipated that REITs would become more 
efficient over time, since improved methods of operation should lower cost. It seems unlikely that 
REITs become less efficient over time without some external stimulus. Once possible explanation 
relates to increased regulatory control. We leave that conjecture for future research. 
 Finally, self-management exhibits contrary results, depending on whether we define output 
as assets or revenue. Self-managed REITs exhibit improved efficiency when we define output as 
revenue, but worsened efficiency when we define output as assets. That later finding proves 
consistent with the results of Bers and Springer (1998b) and Anderson, Springer, Fok, and Webb 
(2002) while the former, with Lewis, Springer, and Anderson (2003). In the conclusion, we 
speculate that REIT managers may focus much more energy on achieving revenue than assets, 
suggesting that revenue provides a better measure of REIT output. 
V. Conclusions 
The results show that the estimated returns to scale for publicly traded REITs do not support 
economies of scale. That is, our findings suggest either no economies or diseconomies of scale or 
possibly diseconomies of scale. Previous studies generally find economies of scale. Those studies 
use older data and cross-section analysis. Our panel-data model extends the coverage through 
2003. The rapid growth in the size of REITs may suggest the exhaustion of economies of scale for 
all but the smaller firms in the industry. Breaking the sample into sub-periods and into size classes 
can provide further evidence on this issue. That is, given the dramatic growth in average REIT size 
over the sample period, the movement from economies of scale early in the sample period to 
diseconomies of scale at the end of the sample period makes intuitive sense. We leave such 
speculation for future research.  
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 The initial tests of REIT efficiency using DEA report large inefficiencies (Anderson, 
Springer, Fok, and Webb, 2002; Anderson and Springer, 2003). Lewis, Springer, and Anderson 
(2003) employ a stochastic frontier and report much lower levels of inefficiency than either of the 
DEA studies. This study generally documents even lower inefficiencies. But, we also find that 
inefficiencies increase over time,  
 The finding that a higher debt-to-asset ratio associates with more efficiency runs counter to 
the findings of Lewis, Springer, and Anderson (2003). As noted in the text, we employ the debt-to-
asset ratio to shift the frontier cost function as well as to explain the one-sided (inefficiency) error 
term. We do find that higher leverage raises the cost frontier as well as lowering inefficiency. 
Jensen (1986) argues that higher leverage can induce less efficiency through agency problems 
between managers and owners or more efficiency due to more intense external monitoring. Our 
results conform to that latter view.  
 Our results also offer some apparent contradictions to conventional wisdom as well as 
further insight into a better understanding the industry’s rapid growth. Conventional wisdom and 
prior research suggest that self-managed REITs prove more efficient than the alternatives, namely 
affiliate- or third-party managed REITs. The results indicate different outcomes depending on our 
measure of output. When we measure output with assets, self-management associates with more 
inefficiency. This result supports an agency problem theory that managers act in their own self-
interest to the detriment of the firm as a whole. When we measure output with revenue, self-
management exhibits more efficiency, reversing the agency problem theory. How can we 
rationalize such findings? One possible explanation argues that revenue better captures the goal of 
managers. Thus, managers expend much effort to wring additional revenue out of their firm with 
much less concern about firm size, as measured by assets. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Average Median MaximumMinimum
lnCost 11.0783 11.2330 15.9116 2.6391 
lnAsset 13.2183 13.4453 17.0662 7.2779 
lnRevenue 11.3127 11.5140 15.9870 2.0794 
ln(1+i) 0.0653 0.0631 1.0756 0.0000 
ln(1+r) 0.1051 0.0784 1.7815 0.0012 
Time 4.7942 5.0000 9.0000 1.0000 
Self-Manage 0.7758 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 
Debt-Ratio 0.4941 0.4881 0.9964 0.0031 
Note: The symbol ln stands for the natural logarithm. Cost includes interest 
expense, operating expense, general and administrative expense, and 
management fees interest cost on all deposits. Asset equals total assets. 
Revenue equals total revenue. We calculate the input prices as follows: 
i equals the average interest cost per dollar of debt and r equals the 
average other expenses per dollar of assets. Time runs from 1 to 9 
capturing 1995 to 2003. Self-Manage equals one for self-managed 
REITs; 0 otherwise. Debt-Ratio equals the ratio of total debt to total 
assets. 
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Table 2: Translog Cost Function with Output Measured 
as Total Assets 
 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio 
Cost Frontier Estimates 
Constant1 -1.1090 -1.54 -4.0884* -15.52 
lnAss 0.6217* 5.63 1.0166* 26.88 
lnAss*lnAss 0.0143* 3.33 0.0005 0.39 
ln(1+i)     10.1945* 10.37 
ln(1+i)*ln(1+i)     -5.3714* -17.22 
ln(1+r)     7.5172* 19.29 
ln(1+r)*ln(1+r)     -2.9532* -42.84 
lnAss*ln(1+i)     -0.1027* -2.62 
lnAss*ln(1+r)     0.0129 0.88 
ln(1+i)*ln(1+r)     -4.6010* -13.30 
Debt-Ratio 2.0825* 29.41 0.9097* 32.54 
One-Sided Error (Inefficiency) Estimates 
Constant2 -1.6301* -5.27 0.0148 0.56 
Time 0.2886* 13.47 -0.0055* -5.70 
Self-Manage 0.5978* 3.59 0.1068* 2.68 
Debt-Ratio -11.5772* -34.08 -0.0716* -4.41 
      
Average Efficiency 1.9018 1.1349 
      
Sigma-Squared 2.4366* 16.49 0.0509* 30.10 
Gamma 0.9368* 173.46 0.0019** 1.80 
Economies of Scale 
Average 0.9997 1.0245 
Median 1.0062 1.0246 
Maximum 1.1098 1.0283 
Minimum 0.8298 1.0185 
Note: See Table 1. We specify the cost frontier as a translog function where the debt-
to-asset ratio shifts the intercept. Ass equals total assets. Sigma-squared (σ2) 
equals σv2 + σu2 and gamma equals σu2/σ2. 
 
* means significantly different from zero at the 1-percent level. 
** means significantly different from zero at the 5-percent level. 
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Table 3: Translog Cost Function with Output Measured as 
Total Revenue 
 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio 
Cost Frontier Estimates 
Constant1 0.7428* 5.39 0.4493* 2.94 
lnRev 0.6981* 28.89 0.7469* 27.26 
lnRev*lnRev 0.0136* 12.31 0.0113* 8.95 
ln(1+i)   -0.3388 -0.37 
ln(1+i)*ln(1+i)     -0.9255* -2.97 
ln(1+r)     3.9068* 12.29 
ln(1+r)*ln(1+r)     -0.7522* -8.17 
lnRev*ln(1+I)     0.0615 1.39 
lnRev*ln(1+r)     -0.0893* -6.43 
ln(1+i)*ln(1+r)     0.0374 0.10 
Debt-Ratio 0.9819* 30.13 0.7020* 23.68 
One-Sided Error (Inefficiency) Estimates 
Constant2 -2.3940* -4.49 -6.2220* -3.58 
Time 0.1490* 5.07 0.1971* 10.70 
Self-Manage -0.7536* -10.19 -1.0972** -2.46 
Debt-Ratio -4.9426* -20.58 0.0034 0.00 
      
Average Efficiency 1.2211 1.1404 
      
Sigma-Squared 0.8796* 8.02 0.7813* 3.84 
Gamma 0.9621* 197.33 0.9620* 80.79 
Economies of Scale 
Average 1.0058 0.9972 
Median 1.0113 1.0071 
Maximum 1.1329 1.1028 
Minimum 0.7547 0.7885 
Note: See Tables 1 and 2. Rev equal total revenue. 
 
* means significantly different from zero at the 1-percent level. 
** means significantly different from zero at the 5-percent level. 
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